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Korea’s presidential election of December 19, 2002, has baffled many observers.
Sociologically, it must be understood in the context of major transformations in the
wider society. This paper examines the claims made by some observers that attribute
the election results to the revolt of the younger generation, and to the ideological split
that surfaced in Korean society. By examining data on voting behavior, it is ascertained
that age may have influenced the election results, however, regional divisions still made
the most difference. The information revolution also had a significant influence on the
process. Implications of these findings are discussed against the backdrop of broader
societal changes, with some thoughts on the prospect of the new regime.
INTRODUCTION
A presidential election is an important event in any country. In South
Korea, it is not merely an important event; is critical to the fate of the entire
nation. This may be accounted for by an unusually high degree of concen-
tration of power in the hands of president, and a strong tendency of reliance
on politics among the Korean people in general. The December 19, 2002
election was to become an historic event. To the surprise of the majority of
Korean voters, it became an epoch making event, causing enormous confu-
sion and frustration. 
My aim in this paper, however, is not to examine the “whys” of the elec-
tion results. Rather, my interest lies in tapping into the nature of societal
changes that have loomed beneath the surface of this historic event. My
emphasis is on the fact that people have not simply been unaware of these
changes that have been ongoing, and that have already made much differ-
ence in daily living. These changes have made their presence and effect
apparent through the external event of the election. 
First, I investigate some of the most prominent signs of changes that have
caused so much surprise among the general populace to see if they may not
be mere myths. Second, data will be analyzed with respect to the election
results to separate myths from reality. Third, the broad societal changes that
have affected the election process and voting behavior will be briefly enu-
merated. Finally the implications of these myths, reality, and societal
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changes are examined to gain a better understanding of what occurred in
the past, and what is expected in the future for Korean society.
MYTHS: SEA OF CHANGE?
The So-Called 12.19 Syndrome
One month after the December 19, 2002 presidential election in South
Korea, a former journalist related an interesting mood among Koreans. He
wrote that those who considered themselves to be “conservative” suffered
from insomnia, a loss of appetite, of interest in television, and of enthusiasm
in daily life, feeling they have nothing to live for, and thus comforting their
dejected hearts with hard liquor.1
I have also observed a complex of such symptoms among individuals
around me, and label it “the December 19th (or in short, 12.19) Syndrome.”
Many people aged fifty and over have actually gone through a period of
attack by strange symptoms they would never have been afflicted with
under ordinary circumstances. These include headache, common insomnia,
a loss of appetite for, interest in or enthusiasm for food, sex, entertainment
such as TV, social and other daily activities, the wrung out feeling of having
nothing to live for any more, being generally run down, disheartened and
frustrated, unable to believe what has happened to the society, and being
nervous about what is in store for them and for the nation in the coming
days. This has been characterized as “societal panic,” not just psychological
panic. 
Press reports and survey findings have that the 5060 generation, as the
people in their fifties and sixties are referred to in the press, believe they
have suddenly aged within a month since the last presidential election.
Some experts have diagnosed a sort of psychological panic, caused by frus-
tration and remorse over the election results among this older generation,
which goes beyond a simple conflict of generations.2 One sociologist com-
mented that the only voters who are neither worried nor nervous about
Korean society today happen to be the 2030 generation (those in their twen-
ties and thirties), who played a major role in the elections.3
The press painted a grim picture of what was happening and what could
be expected to make this older generation nervous. Some notable samples
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2 Hangyeore Shinmun. January 26, 2003.
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are given below.
“The future has defeated the past in the battle between the past and the
future.” This was the main thrust of a commentary by a sociologist in an
Internet press report. In this article, expressions such as the following
appear: “Something I couldn’t really believe was happening;” “Roh’s victo-
ry is a heroic deed salvaging us from the pit of despair;” “Roh’s election is
not an end but a beginning: while the retrogressive forces in politics have
been cleared up in this election, the new forces have not made their full
appearance yet ... only a new stage for new political forces armed with a
new platform and ideology to lead the way has been provided.”4
The same day, another newspaper had a commentary entitled, “Now is
the time for politics of retaliation! (exclamation mark included)” in which
explicitly hostile expressions were used liberally. Examples included “wipe
out all those guys,” “punish those who betrayed and deceived people with
utter lies,” or “I hope to see the tragic demise of those rats queuing up for
power here and there.”5 Another newspaper stated that the 2030 generation
has surfaced to the fore of Korean society in all fields of politics, economy,
and culture, pushing aside the 4050 generation (people in their forties and
fifties), and that the energy of this generation craving for change is becom-
ing the new source of change in Korean society in the 21st century.6
Other reports claimed that the 2030 generation is the principal actor lead-
ing the rapid change of Korean society from now on, and a warning was
issued on the day after the election that “revolutionary change” is in store,
with the election of a man in his fifties, including a sweeping reshuffling of
the ruling elite forces.7
Generation Revolution or Generational Schism?
Immediately after the election results were disclosed the morning after,
the first wave of media commentaries rushed to hit the generation cord,
asserting that the 2030 generation had triumphed in an election revolution.
The concepts of this media frenzy included “generation revolution” (Chosun
Ilbo. December 20, 2002; Joong-Ang Ilbo. December 21, 2002), “contest of gen-
erations” rather than that of platform or ideology (Chosun Ilbo. December 21,
2002), the “strong blast of generational shift or replacement” (Joong-Ang Ilbo.
December 21, 2002), or “victory” of one generation bringing “defeat” to
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another generation (Chosun Ilbo. December 22, 2002). 
A post-election survey of 1,192 individuals, conducted on December 22,
produced findings that 48.8% of the 2030 age group said they voted for Roh
(reads Noh) Moo-hyun for the sake of a “replacement of generations” or
“generational transfer.” Platform and ideology came second.8 Remarks were
made that pointed to the surfacing of the generation variable, as the 2030
generation had moved into the mainstream and assumed a leading role in
Korean politics through this election, although regional politics still played
a part.9 Going one step further, it was claimed that the power of generation
has demonstrated the possibility of overcoming regionalism in Korean poli-
tics.10 This is a strong statement; to be noted in this connection are claims
that the central axis of Korean elections has moved from regionalism to
“generation,” the emotional generation having represented the revolt and
challenge to the existing values and traditional elements.11 It is suggested
that this was possible because in this election, the attitude of the younger
generation shifted from apathy and indifference to participation, which in
some sense is new in Korean politics.12
It is also asserted that the issue of generation must now be regarded as the
“key issue” in analyzing the tide of the entire society, and not just that of
popular culture or politics, since generation has now surfaced as one of the
“driving forces” of our society. Especially, the younger generation will now
“lead the tide of change” in society, and the power of the 2030 generation
will change society as those “young ones” now have moved into the center
stage of our political culture, changing the mainstream of 21st century
Korea.13
Other voices express concern over these series of comments regarding
generation. While acknowledging that the election results might be consid-
ered as a sort of “generation revolution,” it is warned that this should not be
exaggerated, leading to an actual “conflict of generations,” “confrontation
among generations,” or “exclusion by generation.”14
Some have critically remarked that the press may actually be instigating
or aggravating conflict of generations by the frequent and callous mention
of generation conflicts observed during the election campaigns, in which
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strong support for Roh came from the 2030 generation. It is contended that
these press reports and comments implicitly presume that this conflict of
generations could lead to a “generational war” which could devastate
national integration.15 Similarly, another commentary points out that there
is no such thing as “east-west conflict” (meaning regionalism) or “genera-
tional schism;” these ideas only appear in the editorials of newspapers such
as the Chosun Ilbo.”16 This commentary was offered by the Hangyeore
Shinmun, a self-proclaimed progressive paper that strongly supported Roh. 
Ideological Split?
Reporting the election results, the conservative Chosun Ilbo, warning of
the coming “revolutionary change” in national politics, characterized the
main axis of Roh’s campaign team as those from the democracy movement
of the past generation. It predicted that the new administration would be
filled with people of progressive inclinations rather than seasoned tech-
nocrats, in order to ensure compatibility with Roh’s policy staff which is
strongly tilted to a progressive orientation.17 In a commentary two days
later, it advised that Roh should strive to heal the problem of division and
schism created in the process of elections between conservative and pro-
gressive forces, 2030 and 50+ generations, and east and west.18
On the day after the voting, a known progressive sociologist, claiming
that the future has won over the past, characterized the election results as “a
breakthrough to shatter the half century of the conservative monopoly of
Korean politics”.19
Nonetheless, some questioned these assertions and asked, “Is it really a
defeat of the conservative?” This question is the actual title of a column
written by a former journalist who currently teaches at a university. The
article begins with the following observation: “One of the most commonly
accepted views is that this election was a kind of contest between the con-
servative and progressive, and that Roh’s victory represents the triumph of
the progressive forces, whereas Lee’s defeat means a loss of the conservative
forces. After a lengthy review of the fluctuations of popularity rates for the
major candidates in the opinion polls conducted over the past few months,
the author concludes that this may not be the case, because people’s ideo-
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logical inclinations do not form or change in a short span of time. He, how-
ever, duly warns that the conservatives should take heed of the changing
mood of the society that was manifested in the elections.20
FACTS
It is about time we double-checked whether or not those changes men-
tioned in the press really occurred. In order to do that, we begin with some
findings about the presidential election.
Election Results: General
To begin with, the voter turnout rate was meager 70.8%, (of 34,991,529
total voters), the lowest ever, and 10% lower than 80.7% in the 1997 presi-
dential election. Roh Moo-hyun, the 16th President of the Republic of Korea,
won the office by gaining 48.9% (12,014,277 votes) of the valid ballots cast
(24,561,916 votes) against Lee Hoi Chang who collected 46.6% (11,443,297
votes), but lost by a margin of 2.3% (570,980 votes). The remaining 4.5%
votes went to the other candidates. Interestingly, this figure represents the
largest ballots ever collected by an elected president.21
If we recalculate the results against total voters, instead of the actual bal-
lots cast, the relative proportions of the two contenders are as follows: Roh:
34.3%, Lee: 32.7% (difference: 1.6%), and the rest (including other candi-
dates plus those abstained): 33.0%. This means that Roh was supported by
only about one-third of the total voters or eligible constituent of the entire
population of Korea. Thus, it could be asked how much of a voter revolu-
tion occurred?
Election Results: Regional Division
Comparing Table 1, which contains the official figures of ballots by
region, with figures from 1997, one summary comment about the election
results may be: “East Lee” vs. “West Roh” (in Korean it sounds “Dong Hoi
Chang” vs. “Seo Moo-hyun”). This is almost a complete replica of the 1997
ballots. Once again, regional division was the crucial factor, especially with
overwhelming support for Roh in the Honam (southwestern provinces)
region being 93.2%.22
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This figure could be read as almost absolute support, which is rare in any
ordinary democratic election. In addition, voter turnout rates were also the
highest in this region, with 78.1% in Gwangju City, 76.4% in Joennam
Province, and 74.6% in Jeonbuk Province, which comprise the Honam
region. These figures all surpass the national average of 70.8% participation
(National Election Commission, 2003: 19). Voters in the Honam region not
only went to ballot stations in earnest, but they also cast almost all of their
votes for the candidate of the party of the outgoing president Kim Dae-Jung
(DJ for short). 
DJ originally came from this region, and it has been a staunch bulwark for
him all his political career. It also remained strongly loyal to DJ’s party in
this election, and not necessarily to Roh, whose local origin is not Honam,
but Yeongnam (southeastern provinces). Yeongnam also happens to be
Roh’s opponent Lee’s traditional stronghold. Regional divisions in Korean
politics have been most starkly manifested between these two regions, the
South East (Yeongnam) and the South West (Honam).
The Yeongnam region consists of two large sections. The northern section
contains Daegu City, the third largest city in the country, and Gyeongbuk
Province, the third largest province. The southern section contains Busan,
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chosen by stratified, quota sampling, responded. The relative support for Roh and Lee was
48.2% and 46.4%, respectively. This result came pretty close to the actual ballots of 48.9% for
Roh and 46.6% for Lee. See Gallup Korea (2003).
TABLE 1. REGIONAL DIVISION (%) 
Ballots Voter 2002 1997
Region
cast turnout Roh Lee DJ Lee 
All nation (100.0) 70.8 48.9 46.6 40.3 38.7
Seoul 22.1 71.4 51.3 45.0 44.9 40.9
Capital megalopolis 
(Incheon + Gyeonggi) 24.5 69.2 50.5 44.3 39.1 35.7
Honam region (Gwangju 
+ Jeonbuk + Jeonnam) 12.0 76.2 93.2 4.9 94.4 3.3
North Yeongnam region
(Daegu + Gyeongbuk) 11.2 71.4 20.2 75.5 13.1 66.9
South Yeongnam region
(Busan + Ulsan + Gyeongnam) 16.6 71.5 29.4 65.3 13.7 53.8
Daejeon + Chuncheong 9.4 67.1 52.5 41.3 43.9 27.4
Gangwon 3.1 68.4 41.5 52.5 23.8 43.2
Jeju 1.1 68.6 56.1 39.9 40.6 36.6
Source: Gallup Korea (2003: 35).
the second largest city, Ulsan, the seventh largest city, and Gyeongnam
Province, the second largest province. Yeongnam region still supported
Lee’s party, 75.5% in the north and 65.3% in the south. However, these fig-
ures are no match for the 93.2% that Roh received in the Honam region. This
support may not necessarily have been for Lee as the candidate and even
for the party, but merely against DJ’s party. Anti-DJ sentiment is unusually
strong in theYeongnam region. 
The regional division between the Southeast (Yeongnam) and the
Southwest (Honam) should be examined in context. The size of total voters
(9,636,278) in the Yeongnam region is about 2.5 times that (3,915,466) of the
Honam region, and the number of voters who went to the polls was also 2.3
times larger. Thus, although more than nine out of ten voters supported Roh
in the Honam region, the absolute number of votes was still short of that
cast in the rival Yeongnam region. Therefore, Roh’s victory required rela-
tively larger additional support from other regions. The decisive winning
spot outside the Honam region was in the area where the size of voters was
the largest in the country. This is the region which contains Seoul, the capital
city, plus the so-called capital megalopolis, with 46.6 percent of the total
votes cast, 22.1% in Seoul, and 24.5% in Incheon City and Gyeonggi
Province surrounding Seoul.
In addition, Daejeon City and surrounding North and South
Chungcheong Provinces with 10% of voters also voted for Roh. Slightly
over one-half of the votes went for Roh in this region, a much stronger
showing, even compared to that of DJ’s in 1997. In Seoul, where 21.9% of
voters live, Roh gained over DJ by 6.4%. In contrast, his opponent Lee’s gain
over 1997 votes was only 4.1%. In the Incheon and Gyeonggi area, the incre-
ment over time was +11.4 for Roh, vs. +8.6 for Lee. Lee also gained nearly
10% in the Yeongnam region, compared to his 1997 ballots. Even in this
region that favored Lee, Roh fared well, as compared with DJ, especially in
large cities like Busan and Ulsan, plus Gyeongnam Province, apparently
due to his local origin in this part. Roh is from one of the counties in this
province. These findings strongly suggest that regional divisions largely
determined the voting behavior of the Korean electorate. To determine if
regionalism in Korean politics was really effective in making a difference in
the election, additional survey findings are examined. 
Regional Division: Another Look 
The regional divisions only show the tendency to vote for a specific candi-
date or party according to where one currently lives. If regionalism really
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operates in Korean voting behavior, then voting by region of origin, where
people were born and/or raised, should also indicate some difference. Data
strongly support this assumption, and show a clear regional division once
again between the Honam and Yeongnam regions as shown in Table 2.
Regardless of where one resides at the time of voting, a large majority
(84.5%) of voters originally from the southwest (Honam) voted for Roh. The
proportions drop for Lee, but support in the southeast (Yeongnam) was still
larger for Lee than for Roh. Within the Yeongnam region, relatively stronger
support for Lee came from voters in the northern section (Daegu +
Gyeongbuk) than the southern section (Busan + Ulsan + Gyeongnam),
where Roh is originally from.
Even in the capital megalopolis of Seoul and Incheon + Gyeonggi areas,
which had almost one-half of voters, and which gave Roh a decisive victory,
the proportion of ballots cast for Roh by the people originating from the
Honam region was 86.1% and 84.4% respectively. In this megalopolis, the
tendency was repeated, though to a lesser extent, for Lee in the case of vot-
ers originally from the Yeongnam region. However, Roh gained more votes
than the national average from those who originated from this region,
which also happens to be his own local origin. 
These are persuasive indications that the regional split in Korean elections
is really a Yeongnam vs. Honam division, or a Southeast vs. Southwest split.
This split was created in the past election and political processes, and over-
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TABLE 2. REGION OF ORIGIN (%)
All nation Residents in Residents in
Region of Origin Seoul capital megalopolis
Roh Lee Roh Lee Roh Lee
Seoul 41.7 56.2 43.0 55.0 45.7 52.2
Capital megalopolis
(Incheon + Gyeonggi) 43.6 53.5 34.3 60.6 34.8 60.8
Honam region (Gwangju 
+ Jeonbuk + Jeonnam) 84.5 12.0 86.1 8.6 84.4 11.7
North Yeongnam region
(Daegu + Gyeongbuk) 22.2 69.8 37.9 59.9 30.5 57.2
South Yeongnam region
(Busan + Ulsan + Gyeongnam) 38.8 56.9 37.3 52.5 42.3 53.3
Daejeon + Chungcheong 45.3 47.9 43.1 48.3 50.0 44.4
Gangwon 36.1 55.9 36.4 57.1 43.5 49.8
Jeju 45.7 49.6 56.0 44.0 0.0 100.0
North Korea and other 37.3 56.1 33.1 58.2 38.2 59.5
Source: Gallup Korea (2003: 29-30).
whelmingly slanted votes came from the Southwest than any other regions,
including the Southeast.23
Survey Results: Age Differentials
Much has been said about age and generation making a big difference in
this last election. We investigate if this assertion holds from available empir-
ical data, as presented in Table 3. 
These figures show a distinct age differential in the support for the two
major candidates. The younger generations in their 20s and 30s (or 2030s as
coined by the media) clearly voted for Roh, while those in their 40s and over
gave above average support to Lee. This pattern is repeated in the capital
megalopolis area, including Seoul, where Roh gained a decisive difference
overall. In other regions, however, this age differential pattern does not
hold, suggesting that the regional split still exerts a stronger influence.
Again in the Honam region, it was not age that made the difference. A
significantly larger than average number of votes was cast to Lee among
voters in their 30s, clearly deviating from the national trend. Also, in the
Yeongnam regions, even younger generation voters, i.e. the 2030s, rendered
support to Lee at a level way above the national average. In other regions,
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TABLE 3. AGE DIFFERENTIALS BY REGION (%)
Age and candidate
Region 20s 30s 40s 50s+
Roh Lee Roh Lee Roh Lee Roh Lee
All nation 62.0 31.4 60.2 30.7 43.4 50.8 33.4 65.5
Seoul 70.6 21.1 60.7 29.8 40.9 53.7 38.8 59.0
Capital megalopolis
(Incheon + Gyeonggi) 61.0 31.6 65.1 29.3 40.6 53.0 27.4 70.9
Honam region (Gwangju 
+ Jeonbuk + Jeonnam) 97.5 0.0 86.7 8.4 93.7 4.7 92.7 6.9
North Yeongnam region
(Daegu + Gyeongbuk) 30.7 61.1 37.0 52.1 15.5 82.2 8.7 90.1
South Yeongnam region
(Busan + Ulsan + Gyeongnam) 49.2 44.2 47.5 46.4 30.9 63.1 11.6 86.6
Daejeon + Chungcheong 66.8 25.6 58.4 31.1 53.3 41.1 35.5 61.7
Gangwon 79.5 13.7 48.6 32.2 32.1 65.0 26.1 70.8
Jeju 66.7 16.4 78.4 14.3 56.7 43.3 25.0 75.0
Source: Gallup Korea (2003: 23).
23 For an interesting discussion of regionalism in Korean politics, see Cho Kisuk (1998).
the difference also does not clearly indicate a significant impact of age.
To reiterate, while there is significant evidence of age differences in the
voting behavior of the Korean electorate, regional divisions still played a
more significant role in the last presidential election. The power of the 2030s
generation may have been exaggerated by the media. This will become
more apparent if we examine the relative proportion of age groups in the
total voters and their relative turnout rates, reported by the National
Election Commission (2003: 8-9). 
The first column of Table 4 shows that the relative size of the 2030s is
close to one-half (48.3%) of the total voters, suggesting that their power
could be something to be reckoned with. Their actual contribution to the
ballot, however, has been quite short of their expected share. The second
column of the table shows that their turnout rates at the ballot was only
56.5% among the 20s age group and 67.4% among the 30s, way below the
national average of 70.8%.
A closer look at the voter turnout rates of age groups by region now indi-
cates that the younger voters showed up at the ballot at a substantially high-
er rate than the national average only in those regions where Roh’s victory
was overwhelming or at least decisive, namely, the Honam region and the
capital city of Seoul. Again, the combination of regional loyalty and
predilections of age groups was the determining factor in the election, and
not age alone. Regional split still seems to have exerted stronger influence
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TABLE 4. RELATIVE SIZE OF VOTERS AND VOTER TURNOUT RATES BY AGE (%)
Age
Voters Voter Voter turnout by region*
turnout Seoul A B C D E F G
All (100.0) 70.8 71.4 69.2 76.2 71.4 71.5 67.1 68.4 68.6
20s 23.2 56.5 61.5 55.8 61.6 53.2 55.6 48.7 46.8 54.1
30s 25.1 67.4 66.9 66.9 75.3 66.7 67.8 63.2 63.0 64.9
40s 22.4 76.3 75.5 74.4 81.9 78.3 77.4 74.0 75.2 74.0
50s 12.9 83.7 83.5 81.6 86.7 85.8 84.3 81.8 83.8 81.6
60s 16.4 78.7 79.3 76.6 80.2 80.4 80.4 75.9 78.8 76.6
*A: Capital megalopolis (Incheon City + Gyeonggi Province) 
B: Honam region (Gwangju City + Jeonbuk and Jeonnam Provinces)
C: North Yeongnam region (Daegu City + Gyeongbuk Province) 
D: South Yeongnam region (Busan City + Ulsan City + Gyeongnam Province) 
E: Daejeon City + Chungbuk and Chungnam Provinces 
F: Gangwon Province 
G: Jeju Province
Source: National Election Commission (2003: 8-9, 21-22).
than the generational division. 
Survey Results: Other Factors
To wrap up the empirical picture of the presidential election, we examine
other variables that may be relevant to voting. Table 5 summarizes these
data. The gender differential was not significant, although Roh drew more
votes (50.4%) from male and Lee (49.9%) from female voters. Gender played
a significant role when controlling for age, only in certain specific regions.
In Seoul, the Incheon + Gyeonggi  region, and the Daejeon + Chungcheong
region, where Roh had a strong win over Lee outside the Honam region, the
proportion of male voters in their 20s supporting Roh (73.8%, 68.3%, 79.2%
in the three regions, respectively) largely surpassed the national average of
62.0%. Both in the Honam and Yeongnam regions, the age/sex combination
did not make too much of a difference for either candidate, leading to the
conclusion that regionalism still played the most significant role.
In terms of education, Roh attracted more votes from high school gradu-
ates (50.3%) and those who attended college (52.1%), while Lee’s support
came more from those with only middle school education or less (59.2%). It
is generally known that people with less schooling tend to be more conserv-
ative in their political orientation. In terms of occupation, notable differ-
ences were that college students (59.0%) and blue-collar workers (50.7%)
tilted towards Roh, while farmers (58.1%) voted for Lee. One might surmise
that farmers are more conservative, whereas students and blue-collar work-
ers tend to be less conservative. 
Finally, party support was more apparent than expected, as 95.3% who
supported DJ’s New Millennium Democratic Party voted for Roh, while
91.2% of the Grand National Party supporters went for Lee. This suggests
that voters did not necessarily cast their ballots for the candidate, or it might
be that they voted against the other candidate, and not particularly for the
candidate of their choice. 
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TABLE 5. OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING THE RESULTS (%)
Male Female Education Occupation
Candidate age age Middle High College+ Farmer Blue- College
20s 50s+ school school collar student
Roh 64.8 29.5 39.4 50.3 52.1 40.3 50.7 59.0
Lee 28.4 70.1 59.2 42.7 41.7 58.1 39.0 32.3
Source: Gallup Korea (2003: 22-27).
REFLECTIONS: WHAT REALLY DID HAPPEN? 
Leading up to the election, surprises awaited voters, particularly mem-
bers of the society who had mostly been comfortable with the status quo,
and had been less sensitive to societal changes that had been unfolding for
some time.
Surprise 1: “Who Is Roh Moo-hyun?” — Election of the Politically Unknown
The first surprise was the election of a candidate who happened to be a
political novice, little known as a potential hopeful until he was chosen as
the presidential candidate of his party only a few months before the elec-
tion. So, many people asked, “Who is Roh Moo-hyun?” Even after he
became the party candidate, he had been pulled and pushed around by his
own party members, fingered as a candidate who would be a sure loser, and
had to tread a rocky road that led to the final victory. Until the last minute,
he definitely was an underdog. So, what happened?
Surprise 2: The Young Generation Woke Up
Beginning with the more immediate phenomena in the backdrop, the gen-
eral mood of the people was grave disappointment, disgust, dislike, and
hence widespread indifference with regards to politics in general, politicians
and their parties, especially the national assembly, and thus elections. “Just
sick’n tired!” would be the right expression. A maverick, Roh could have
aroused enough curiosity to attract some unusual attention, particularly of
the younger generation. His major opponent, Lee Hoi Chang was an old-
timer, a repeater with all the flaws of the past election still hovering over his
head.
The voter turnout rate of this presidential election was 70.8%, the record
low ever in any presidential contest. It was 9% lower than the lowest
(79.8%) in that of April 1971, in which Park Chung Hee and Kim Dae Jung
competed. However, it was only around 43% in the most recent local elec-
tions of June 13, 2002, a supposedly big event in which Lee’s opposition
party swept the election, strongly suggesting a sure victory for their presi-
dential candidate, Lee, in the upcoming December 19 election. In the June 13
local elections, the voter turnout rate for the younger generation was much
lower than average: 31.2% for the 20s and 39.3% for the 30s age groups.24
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Nevertheless, in the December 19 election, while still lower than the
national average, the turnout rates for the 2030s did improve, especially in
those regions where Roh made a big difference (Table 4). This shift from
almost complete indifference to more participation by the younger voters is
something new, and apparently was related to Roh’s triumph. The propor-
tion of this age group in the total voters was close to one-half (48.9%).
Surprise 3: The Internet Revolution
According to a loudly claimed and widely shared view in the immediate
post election days, the Internet had brought about the electoral revolution.
A survey report on the Internet use shows a clear pattern of use variation by
age group (See Table 6). It was found that the proportion of those who
believe that the Internet would enhance political participation was twice
larger among Internet users than among non-users.25
In another survey, more than 7 out of 10 people among the 2030 age
group connected on-line daily, while only 3 out of 10 did so among those 40
and older. Also, various social activities are conducted on-line, more than
twice among the 2030 group as compared with those 40 and older.
Consequently, it is maintained that ‘netizen power’ was also the core of the
2030 generation.26 Reflecting these general trends, a new saying has been
coined among social scientists in the field of information society research, to
the effect that “The younger, the richer; the older, the poorer.”
Various remarks on the effect of the Internet were made during the post-
election days. Sample statements are presented here.
“This election was a triumph of the 2030 generation and the Internet
306 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY 
TABLE 6. EXTENT OF INTERNET USE BY AGE








25 Chosun Ilbo. December 22, 2002.
26 Joong-Ang Ilbo. December 23, 2002.
media.” 
“Despite the generally low voter turnout, the reason for the increased
turnout rate by the 2030 generation was the advertisement strategy to
incite voter participation by means of the Internet.” 
“While it was possible for the ‘nomadic’ 2030 generation armed with
informatization and Internet to achieve integration through the Internet,
the older generation lacked the axis of integration.” 
“The cyber campaign through the Internet has replaced the old pat-
terns of cash envelopes and mass rally.” (These quotes are from Chosun
Ilbo. December 20, 2002).
“The information society symbolized by the Internet is rapidly widen-
ing the gap between the new and old generations.” 
“The level of interest in the presidential elections among college stu-
dents has risen due to the Internet, compared with those past elections in
which the politically charged student activists played a much greater
role.”
“We can easily click to get all sorts of information on the platform and
other stuff about each candidate, because even the hobby sites are full of
such messages about the presidential elections.”
“In a situation where political education is quite limited, the Internet
has come to fill the gap and to take the role, and anonymous cyber space,
with its power to diffuse information horizontally, has become a public
square for debate on the national agenda.”
“Although I have been feeling political inefficacy after graduation from
college, the Internet has brought me to ‘political comrades’ out there, for
now you can feel a sense of solidarity once you connect with the right site
on-line” (These quotes are from Joong-Ang Ilbo. December 21, 2002).
Even foreign press like The Guardian of the UK is said to have mentioned
“The First Internet President Roh.” In a talk, the speaker said that compared
with the United State where those who already had some interest in politics
made use of the new communication media called the Internet, Korea is dif-
ferent in that those who had been indifferent to politics so far have come to
have interest and participate in politics by means of the Internet, and thus
the Internet politics is going to continue in Korea while it was a sort of one-
shot phenomenon in the U.S.27
Surprise 4: Mobilizational Politics — New Style
Perhaps one of the most significant changes that occurred during the cam-
paign period of this presidential election has to do with the form, mode, and
mechanism of the mobilization of voters. In the past, campaigns largely
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relied on mass rallies and speech meetings organized and funded by politi-
cal parties, costing significant amounts of money. Currently, the central
mode has emerged to be issue-centered street gatherings legally organized
by the parties, and personal appeals and encouragements on-line, by means
of the Internet and mobile phones, costing little money.
The origin of this type of mobilization of crowds and masses can be traced
to the Red Devils phenomenon that surfaced in Korea during the 2002
Korea-Japan FIFA World Cup soccer matches. This phenomenon was
repeated during the campaign in the form of protest rallies staged to express
grief over the death of two school girls in an accident involving U.S. mili-
tary forces, and grievances against the U.S. Army authorities, which affected
the election results. The Roh camp made full use of this new trend of rising
anti-American sentiment. His camp members had been well trained in their
earlier political involvement as student activists in the pro-democracy
movements. One of the unique features of this type of mass mobilization is
that it is swift and widespread. Internet and mobile phones can disseminate
messages and instigate mass mobilization throughout the nation in a matter
of seconds.
Surprise 5: Ideological Split Surfaced
In Korea, ideology has been almost a taboo and Koreans had inhibitions
about publicly expressing their ideological inclinations. Essentially, permit-
ted ideologies were confined largely to nationalism and anti-communism.
Student movements initially meant for democratization became ideological
struggles involving vulgar Marxism-Leninism and even Kim-Il-Sungism or
Juche ideology, especially since the 1980s. Recently however, there have been
gradual and implicit trends of loosening the grip of ideological dichotomy;
people are becoming more tolerant of differences and their open expressions
in word and deed. This is largely due to the changing nature of North-South
Korean relationships in the past decade, and especially since the pursuit by
the Kim Dae Jung administration of engaging the North under the
“Sunshine Policy.” Suddenly, South Koreans were exposed to open declara-
tions of presidential bids by candidates with clear-cut socialist platforms,
and not necessarily hidden socialist orientations. These candidates repre-
sented the Socialist Party and the Democratic Labor Party. 
In a survey conducted after the election (January 4-13, 2003), it was ascer-
tained that the self-reported ideological inclination of the Korean people
had shifted, in a time-span of one year, from a strong middle-of-the-road
position to more clearly expressed conservative or progressive positions. A
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distinct trend is a substantial increase in the progressive category, accompa-
nied by a decline of the middle-of-the-road group, and a minor rise of con-
servatives.28 The figures are presented in Table 7. 
In terms of ideological inclination scores (range: most progressive 0; mid-
dle 5; and most conservative 10), the average has fallen from 5.2 in January
2002 to 4.97 in January 2003, slightly tilting towards the progressive end.
This shift has been observed for all age groups except for those 50 and older,
and the largest shift has been found among those in their 40s; from 5.4 to
4.88. Applying the same score, Roh scored 4.2 and Lee 6.4 in August 2002,
but this changed to 3.83 for Roh and 6.27 for Lee in January 2003, indicating
that Roh’s score moved further towards the progressive pole. In August
2002, the distance in ideology scores for the two candidates was identical,
1.1 points for both Roh and Lee. In January 2003, the distance had widened
for Lee to 1.30 from 1.1, but it remained about the same for Roh (1.14). Lee
must have been perceived as having become more conservative over time.
Another newspaper offered a slightly different view of the ideological
shift about three months after the inauguration of President Roh. According
to this report, there has been an increase in the relative proportion of those
who believe they are progressives, accompanied by a decrease in the pro-
portion that is inclined to be conservative. In this poll, there has also been
an increase in the percentage of the middle-of-the-roaders (see the two
right-hand columns of Table 7). Nonetheless, the average score has shifted
towards the center from the right, dropping from 4.1 to 1.8 on a scale of -50
(most progressive) and +50 (most conservative). The proportion of the mid-
dle-of-the-road group has risen from a simple majority of 59.2% to a strong
majority of 67.1%. Although their relative proportion has increased, the pro-
gressive element accounted for only 12.4% in 2003, a rise from 8.3% in
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TABLE 7. SHIFT IN THE IDEOLOGICAL INCLINATIONS OF THE PEOPLE (%)
Joong-Ang Ilbo* Chosun Ilbo**
Ideological General Opinion
inclination populace makers
2002 2003 2003 2002 2003
Conservative 28.5 31.3 22.3 32.5 20.5
Middle-of-the road 49.5 34.8 35.6 59.2 67.1
Progressive 21.4 34.0 42.1 8.3 12.4
Sources: *Joong-Ang Ilbo. February 10, 2003; **Chosun Ilbo. May 2, 2003.
28 Joong-Ang Ilbo. February 10, 2003.
2002.29
Therefore, it has been interpreted that this general shift in the people’s
ideological inclinations may be one factor explaining Roh’s victory, and that
this may be a sign that people are beginning to assume a wait-and-see atti-
tude towards a “progressively inclined” president. Igniting this ideological
awakening during the campaign, an anti-American mood was created and
disseminated, especially among the younger voters who were readily agitat-
ed and mobilized by means of the Internet and mobile phones. This was
caused by a traffic accident that involved American soldiers running over
two Korean school girls in a regular military exercise. Rage over this inci-
dence exploded into a series of mass candle light rallies against the United
States, when the court martial of the U.S. Forces in Korea acquitted the two
soldiers due to mechanical failures. This incidence definitely affected the
election results in favor of Roh, who was depicted by Americans as a man
who does not speak English, and has never been to the United States in his
life.
Anti-American sentiment, combined with the North Korean nuclear has-
sle, has opened up another channel through which hitherto dormant ideo-
logical inclinations have been more openly and explicitly expressed, causing
a schism in society along this ideological line, and alarming the older and
more conservative elements in the society about the potential danger of sub-
verting the nation to a leftist regime of North Korea. 
Surprise? No Surprise — Regional Division
Despite changes that surprised major segments of Korean society, regional
division in presidential elections did not change. While people may have
been afraid of the operation of regional division, they certainly were sur-
prised to find that an overwhelming majority in the Honam region still
stuck with their “man,” even if a surrogate or stooge of DJ. Again, in this
region, even age and generation were not significant. As for the Yeongnam
region, though substantially reduced, a majority of voters also went for the
opposition candidate, Lee, not necessarily because they liked the person or
his party, but largely because they did not want to go for DJ and/or his
stooge. As shown in Table 3, even in the Yeongnam region where age did
make a significant difference, the proportion of the 2030 age group voting
for Roh still fell way short of his national average in that age category.
In those regions without a clear regional candidate or “their own boy” in
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the contest, two things are apparent. First, the voter turnout rate was the
lowest in the Chungcheong region and Incheon. The figures show that
against the national average of 70.8%, the rates were 65.9% in South
Chungcheong Province, 67.9% in North Chungcheong Province, 67.4% in
Daejeon City, and 66.1% in Incheon City, a part of the capital megalopolis.
Second, in these regions, a majority did vote for Roh. In conclusion, regional
division was not overcome, as has been argued.
WRAP UP: SOCIETAL CHANGE IN RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
Broad Societal Change in the Backdrop
However it has been perceived by the general populace, Korean society
has undergone tremendous waves of change in the past half century, espe-
cially in the most recent decades. To begin with, one might cite industrial-
ization, urbanization, rising standards of living, changing life-styles, chang-
ing values, and changing human relations, as outstanding aspects of trans-
formations. In the process, remarkable demographic changes have occurred.
These include an aging population (7% 65 years and older as of 2000), a
sharp drop in crude fertility rate (1.3 as of 2000, the lowest among OECD
nations), and a rapid rise in divorce (over 4 out of 10 marriages ending each
year as of 2000).30
Political democratization and societal liberalization began in earnest in
1987. They have advanced with the consequences of free election, free press,
free organization, free demonstration, free ideological stance, free choice of
a variety of alternatives in social customs and cultural items, plus eruption
of violent industrial conflict and the initiation of burgeoning civil move-
ment organizations. 
Especially in the past decade, significant shifts have occurred in the lead-
ing social forces constituting the power elite in control of national manage-
ment. With the transition period of the Roh Tae Woo administration behind,
the erstwhile political radicals and activists who fought in the pro-democra-
cy movements have now moved into the power center. This process of
replacement of the mainstream social forces began in the YS government,
but the extent of such replacement was still limited. This process became
much more vigorous, open, and extensive since DJ assumed power. This
new power elite corps attempted various reforms, mainly in the economic
system, with minor changes in other sectors. 
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Beginning with the Roh Tae Woo administration, the policy of detente
with North Korea has left grave imprints on the minds of the general popu-
lace, regarding the ideological orientation of South Koreans towards the
North. A consequence has been confusion over whether to consider the
North friend or foe. The notion of the “chief enemy” has been challenged.
Socialistic advocacy has explicitly crept into various social movements with-
out much inhibition, and ideological split has become more pronounced.
In the economic sphere, the financial crisis calling for IMF bailout has left
Korean society more divided and disheartened. The middle-class has been
shrinking dramatically, the class division or the gap between the rich and
poor has worsened, job security has become endangered, household debts
have been mounting, and in general, a sense of insecurity permeates society.
Despite such unprecedented changes in society, politics remained basical-
ly unchanged, and various scandals erupted, even within this new corps of
politicians who boasted a proud record of pro-democracy activism. This
severely tarnished their monopoly over moral righteousness. The industrial
relations field has not changed character, and is hurting the economy and
society. Its violent and illegal labor disputes continue to haunt feeble busi-
ness and social life.
Technological innovations affecting the Korean economy, social organiza-
tion, and life-world are more rapid and recent changes. Revolutionary
changes in information-communication technologies are causing major
changes in the form of network society, digitalizing, cyber community and
culture, on-line communication and transaction, by means of computer, tele-
phone and mobile, multimedia, and the like. This has created what is
known as the “digital divide,” where it is claimed that “the younger, the
richer; the older, the poorer,” with social class division becoming more
apparent, relative to contact with and use of available information.
In general, society has become looser in terms of morals, values, social
norms and rule observances. Solid social ties have been weakened, social
conflicts are still rampant, and social disintegration seems to be pending.
What Is in Store for the Future?
With the new administration in charge, the Roh Moo-hyun camp seems to
be determined to lead the nation with “its own men.” On the surface at
least, they appear to be composed of erstwhile activists, radicals in some
sense, and relatively young and eager to engage in swift changes in politics,
society, and the economy. The advance of the so-called 386ers, the nickname
attached to those who were born in the 1960s, who went to college in the
312 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY 
1980s when the student movement was at its peak in terms of ideological
radicalization and violence, and who are now in their 30s, to the center
stage of the state apparatus has become more pronounced and widespread.
This is sufficient cause for alarm among the relatively conservative older
generation with vested interests. 
Depending on “what” reforms and “how” changes are pursued, resis-
tance will be met from conservative groups and those with vested interests,
notably the state bureaucracy, the corporate sector, and the social elite who
are excluded from the current regime. This will affect the success or failure
of the new regime. The regime could react with the notion of “class war,”
and mobilize certain elements of civil society, as DJ did. The consequences
of this reaction are unpredictable. A more moderate response from the
regime could lead to compromised results, which could mean only “half
success” in terms of intended reforms, though with reasonable stability in
society attained.
Industrial conflict is another crucial factor affecting the path of the regime
and Korean society. In the six month period of the regime change, there
have already been violent and intensive strikes and sit-ins waged by radical
labor unions, truckers’ associations, and farmers. These have affected the
economy and cost corporations billions of dollars. The incessant labor dis-
putes have given the nation the unwelcome name of a militant “labor state,”
and have virtually chased away prospective foreign investors. This is a very
complicated phenomenon for the apparently pro-labor regime to reasonably
handle. Labor may have decided to take advantage of the pro-labor tenden-
cy of the new regime to raise its voice and reap any economic and political
gains. The response of the administration initially was leniency, and the
result was devastating as labor did not cooperate. Currently, the regime has
to wield its power to put down the rampant illicit strikes. The result is that
labor is turning against the regime. Either way, adamant or lenient, the
regime has not been able to solicit cooperation from labor. As a conse-
quence, management has become bitterly sore, the economy is bleeding
badly, and the populace is worried. 
Another important factor is how the new regime is going to manage
international relations, especially with respect to the North Korean nuclear
issue, and Korea-U.S. relations. DJ’s Sunshine Policy, despite some of its
supposedly positive effects, has left the South in a hostage position in the
hands of Kim Jong Il. He continues to play a very tricky and hazardous
game of brinkmanship. The U.S., faced with the changing mood of South
Koreans, which carries a tint of anti-American sentiment that has been
unthinkable so far, is beginning to rethink its alliance with South Korea. 
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To top these, the economy seems to be precariously treading down-hill.
Some have claimed its position is similar to that of the 1997 financial crisis.
Finally, reform and reshuffling of politics are going to be crucial factors that
determine the future of Korean society, and the prospect does not seem to be
too bright. Many may be wondering that the burdens on the shoulder of the
new president and his entourage may be too heavy for them to carry effec-
tively.
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